

SECTIONALISM IN THE EARLY 19TH CENTURY

With the War of 1812 behind them, Americans turned more seriously than ever before, to the tasks of expansion and national development. The so-called Era of Good Feelings (1817-23) found politicians largely in agreement on a national agenda, and a string of diplomatic achievements forged by John Quincy Adams gave the nation sharper definition. But the limits to expansion also became clear: the Panic of 1819 showed the dangers of economic growth, the Missouri Crisis laid bare the sectional split that attended westward expansion.

President Monroe sought a government of national unity, and he chose men from North and South, Jeffersonian Republicans and Federalists, for his cabinet. He selected John Quincy Adams, a former Federalist, as his secretary of state, virtually assuring that Adams, like his father, would become president. To balance Adams, Monroe picked John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, a prominent War Hawk, as secretary of war. And Monroe supported the American system, a program of national economic development that became identified with westerner Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

In supporting the American System, Monroe was following President Madison, who had proposed the program in his message to Congress in December 1815. Madison and Monroe broke with Jefferson's agrarianism to embrace much of the Federalist program for economic development, including chartering a national bank, a tax on imported goods to protect American manufacturers, and a national system of roads and canals. All three of these had first been proposed by Alexander Hamilton in the 1790s. At the time, these proposals had met with bitter Jeffersonian Republican opposition. The support that Madison and Monroe gave to Hamilton's ideas following the War of 1812 was a crucial sign of the dynamism of the American commercial economy. Many Republicans now acknowledged that the federal government had a role to play in fostering the economic and commercial conditions in which both yeoman farmer and merchant could succeed.

American System

Ideas and Movements

A plan to strengthen and unify the nation, the American System was advanced by the Whig Party and a number of leading politicians including Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun and John Quincy Adams. The American System was a new form of federalism that included:

- Support for a high tariff to protect American industries (in particular from British manufacturers who flooded the US market with their products following the War of 1812) and generate revenue for the federal government
- Preservation of the Bank of the United States to stabilize the currency and rein in risky state and local banks
 - The Second Bank of the United States was chartered in 1816 after Jeffersonian Republicans allowed the original Bank's charter to expire in 1811
- Development of a system of internal improvements (such as roads and canals) which would knit the nation together and be financed by the tariff and land sales revenues.

Clay argued that the West, which opposed the tariff, should support it since urban factory workers would be consumers of western foods. In Clay's view, the South (which also opposed high tariffs) should support them because of the ready market for cotton in northern mills. This last argument was the weak link. The South was never really on board with the American System and had access to plenty of markets for its cotton exports.

Clay first used the term "American System" in 1824, although he had been working for its specifics for many years previously.

Portions of the American System were enacted by Congress. The Second Bank of the United States was rechartered in 1816 for 20 years. High tariffs were maintained from the days of Hamilton until 1832. However, the national system of internal improvements was never adequately funded; the failure to do so was due in part to sectional jealousies and constitutional scruples about such expenditures.



Henry Clay

Despite his uneven success in gaining passage of all aspects of the American System, Henry Clay was proud of the plan. In a speech in Cincinnati in 1830, he declared:

That system has had a wonderful success. It has more than realized all the hopes of its founders. It has completely falsified all the predictions of its opponents. It has increased the wealth, and power, and population of the nation. It has diminished the price of articles of consumption and has placed them within the reach of a far greater number of our people than could have found means to command them if they had been manufactured abroad instead of at home.

The three aspects of the American System – bank, tariff, and roads – were all parts of the basic infrastructure that the American economy needed in order to develop and an indication that the strength of commercial interests had grown to rival that of farmers. Briefly, during the Era of Good Feelings, politicians agreed about the need for all three. Later each would be a source of heated partisan argument.

HENRY CLAY'S AMERICAN SYSTEM –

1) Protective Tariffs –

Designed to...

2) National Bank –

Designed to...

3) Internal Improvements

Designed to...

TASK:

How was Clay's American System a compromise?

How did Clay's American System contribute to growing regional differences?

Tariff of 1816: Protecting American Manufacturing

Foreign Affairs, The Madison Administration

The recently concluded War of 1812 forced Americans to confront the issue of protecting their struggling industries. The British had stashed large quantities of manufactured goods in warehouses during the war, but when peace was achieved in 1815, a flood of these goods was dumped on the American market. New England manufacturing concerns found it almost impossible to compete with the cheap foreign imports.

Voices for protective legislation were found among the former War Hawks. Henry Clay argued on behalf of the domestic mill and iron industries. John C. Calhoun, who would later be an ardent foe of high tariffs, supported protectionism because he believed that the South's future would include industrial development.

The Tariff of 1816 was a mildly protectionist measure, raising the average rates to around 20 percent. New England manufacturers actually desired higher rates, but had not yet developed a sufficient political presence in Washington to have their way.

Daniel Webster, a great spokesman for New England interests, opposed the tariff measure. He did not want to see the nation's industrial base broadened, fearing that New England's commercial strength would be diluted.

John Randolph also opposed the tariff, arguing the Southern position:

It eventuates in this: whether you, as a planter will consent to be taxed, in order to hire another man to go to work in a shoemaker's shop, or to set up a spinning jenny. For my part I will not agree to it, even though they should, by way of return, agree to be taxed to help us to plant tobacco; much less will I agree to pay all, and receive nothing for it. No, I will buy where I can get manufactures cheapest; I will not agree to lay a duty on the cultivators of the soil to encourage exotic manufactures; because, after all, we should only get much worse things at a much higher price, and we, the cultivators of the country, would in the end pay all.

The 1816 tariff act was the first true protectionist measure, reversing the revenue-generation emphasis of the 1789 measure. Protectionist forces would gather strength and improve their position in 1824.

TARIFF OF 1816 –

What is it?

What is it designed to do?

The Panic of 1819

A PANIC IS PRECIPITATED BY wild speculation in western lands, followed by a sharp contraction of credit, led by the Second Bank of the United States. A six-year depression ensues. America's first serious panic, occurring early in the year, is followed by a depression.

In 1819 a financial panic swept across the country. The growth in trade that followed the War of 1812 came to an abrupt halt. Unemployment mounted, banks failed, mortgages were foreclosed, and agricultural prices fell by half. Investment in western lands collapsed.

The panic was frightening in its scope and impact. In New York State, property values fell from \$315 million in 1818 to \$256 million in 1820. In Richmond, property values fell by half. In Pennsylvania, land values plunged from \$150 an acre in 1815 to \$35 in 1819. In Philadelphia, 1,808 individuals were committed to debtors' prison. In Boston, the figure was 3,500.

For the first time in American history, the problem of urban poverty commanded public attention. In New York in 1819, the Society for the Prevention of Pauperism counted 8,000 paupers out of a population of 120,000. The next year, the figure climbed to 13,000. Fifty thousand people were unemployed or irregularly employed in New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and one foreign observer estimated that half a million people were jobless nationwide. To address the problem of destitution, newspapers appealed for old clothes and

shoes for the poor, and churches and municipal governments distributed soup. Baltimore set up 12 soup kitchens in 1820 to give food to the poor.

The downswing spread like a plague across the country. In Cincinnati, bankruptcy sales occurred almost daily. In Lexington, Kentucky, factories worth half a million dollars were idle. Matthew Carey, a Philadelphia economist, estimated that 3 million people, one-third of the nation's population, were adversely affected by the panic. In 1820, John C. Calhoun commented: "There has been within these two years an immense revolution of fortunes in every part of the Union; enormous numbers of persons utterly ruined; multitudes in deep distress."

The panic had several causes, including a dramatic decline in cotton prices, a contraction of credit by the Bank of the United States designed to curb inflation, an 1817 congressional order requiring hard-currency payments for land purchases, and the closing of many factories due to foreign competition.

The panic unleashed a storm of popular protest. Many debtors agitated for "stay laws" to provide relief from debts as well as the abolition of debtors' prisons. Manufacturing interests called for increased protection from foreign imports, but a growing number of southerners believed that high protective tariffs, which raised the cost of imported goods and reduced the flow of international trade, were the root of their troubles. Many people clamored for a reduction in the cost of government and pressed for sharp reductions in federal and state budgets. Others, particularly in the South and West, blamed the panic on the nation's banks and particularly the tight-money policies of the Bank of the United States. In the 1830s, Andrew Jackson would build a political movement on their resentment.

By 1823 the panic was over. But it left a lasting imprint on American politics. The panic led to demands for the democratization of state constitutions, an end to restrictions on voting and office holding, and heightened hostility toward banks and other "privileged" corporations and monopolies. The panic also exacerbated tensions within the Republican Party and aggravated sectional tensions as northerners pressed for higher tariffs while southerners abandoned their support of nationalistic economic programs.

A symbol of this transitional time, the Panic of 1819 showed how far the country had moved since 1800, from Jefferson's republic of yeoman farmers toward a nation dominated by commerce. The anger and resentment expressed by the groups harmed by the depression – farmers, urban workers, and southern planters – were portents of the politics of the upcoming Jackson era.

THE PANIC OF 1819 –

Cause:

Outcome:


Missouri Compromise and the Tallmadge Amendment

MISSOURI COMPROMISE

Date: 1819–1821

From: *Encyclopedia of American History: Expansion and Reform, 1813 to 1855*, Revised Edition (Volume IV).

The question of whether the North or the South would control the Union was older than the Constitution itself. During the Constitutional Convention, delegates from the North and South argued heatedly over counting slaves for the purpose of representation and taxes. In 1787, Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance, which prevented anyone from bringing slaves into the territories between the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. After that, slave states and free states were admitted in pairs so that neither the North nor the South would have more states than the other. Thus, Vermont and Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio, Louisiana and Indiana, and Mississippi and Illinois entered at the same time. By 1819, there were 11 free and 11 slave states.



During those years, Congress was divided over questions of taxing imports to protect manufacturers in the North, establishing a national bank (which the North wanted), and building roads and canals that would connect the North with the West. At the same time, the population of the North was growing faster than the population of the South. Because of this rapid growth in population, the House of Representatives included 105 representatives from free states and only 81 from slave states. Southerners believed that they needed to have as many slave as free states to preserve the balance in the Senate and to prevent the North from passing laws that would hurt the South.

A series of events and debates concerning the admission of Missouri to statehood and the question of whether slavery should be allowed to extend into the western territories resulted in the Missouri Compromise. In 1818, the legislature of Missouri Territory petitioned Congress for statehood. By this time, the territory had gained sufficient population to become a state, with most of its residents hailing from the South. Many of these settlers had brought slaves with them; slavery had also existed in the territory when it was a French colony. When the Missouri Territory applied to be admitted as a state, about one-third of its 66,000 people were slaves. Thus, the territorial legislature wanted Missouri to be admitted to the Union as a slave state.

However, in February 1819, Representative James Tallmadge of New York proposed an amendment to the Missouri statehood bill which stated that ...

...the further introduction of slavery be prohibited...and that all children born within the said State, after the admission thereof into the Union, shall be free at the age of 25 years.

The Tallmadge Amendment, of course, would not have interfered with slavery in the states where it already existed, and it would not have deprived any master of his property. It even allowed masters in Missouri to keep children of their slaves born after the amendment passed until these children reached the age of 25, and slaves

born before the amendment was passed would remain slaves for their entire lives. The amendment, however, would lead to the eventual end of slavery in Missouri and discourage slave owners from taking their slaves to that state. If similar amendments were adopted, slavery could not spread, and free states would outnumber slave states. This was unacceptable to most Southerners, who raised such a storm of protest that Thomas Jefferson, who opposed the amendment, wrote:

At this momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror. I considered it at once as the death knell of the Union.

In opposition to this attempt to limit the extension of slavery a Congressman from Virginia wrote:

A prohibition of the importation of slaves would prevent the immigration of the Southern people to the State of Missouri. Would it be just to adopt such a regulation as would open a tract of the most fertile land to the Northern part of the United States, and, in effect, shut out the whole Southern people?

In the North, the arguments in favor of the amendment were often cast in moral terms:


An opportunity is now presented, if not to diminish, at least to prevent, the growth of a sin which sits heavy on the soul of every one of us. By embracing this opportunity, we may retrieve the national character, and, in some degree, our own.

The issue of slavery had not caused such tension since the Constitutional Convention of 1787. As was the case in 1787, the new controversy over slavery centered on a battle for power between free, northern states and southern states with slave economies. Northern politicians were still bitter about the constitutional compromise, which allowed southern states to count each slave as three-fifths of a person for the purpose of representation. Because northern politicians already believed the southern states possessed an unfair advantage in representation in Congress, the prospect of Missouri entering the Union as a slave state further threatened northern power.

But the battle over slavery during the Missouri controversy was not only about political representation. On the proslavery side, the increased passion with which southern slaveholders defended the slave system was due to the increasing value of their slaves. After the invention of the cotton gin in 1793 and given the expansion into new territories with a climate ideal for growing cotton, the profitability of the slave system (previously believed to be on the wane) soared. Thus, slaveholders began to respond to any antislavery proposals with increased vehemence.

Tallmadge's proposal triggered intense debate in Congress, dividing the North and the South into sectional interests—an early version of the ideological and economic divide that would lead to war four decades later. Over a period of two years, Representatives and Senators made hundreds of angry speeches arguing for and against the Tallmadge Amendment. Sections from two of them are reprinted below. As so many others had, these speakers argued whether slavery was morally wrong, how well or badly the slaves were treated, and whether the Constitution gave Congress the right to stop the spread of slavery.

Livermore: For Amendment
Morality and Treatment




Arthur Livermore

I hope to [prove] that we are not bound to tolerate [put up with] the existence of so disgraceful a state of things [as slavery] in its present extent, and that it would be... very unjust to let it spread over the whole face of the Western territory.

Slavery in the United States is the condition of man subjected to the will of a master, who can make any [action] of him short of taking away his life. In those States where it is [allowed], laws are enacted, making it a penalty to instruct slaves in the art of reading, and they are not permitted to attend public worship, or to hear the Gospel [Bible] preached. Thus the light of science and of religion are utterly excluded from the mind, so that the body may be more easily bowed down to servitude. The bodies of slaves may, with no punishment, be prostituted to any purpose, and deformed in any manner by their owners. The sympathies of nature in slaves are disregarded; mothers and children are sold and separated; the children wring their little hands in agonies of grief, while their mothers commit suicide in despair.

How long will the desire of wealth [make] us blind to the sin of holding both the bodies and souls of our fellow men in chains!

Pinckney: Against Amendment
Morality and Treatment



Charles Pinckney

Is there a single line in the Old or New Testament either censuring [opposing] or forbidding it [slavery]? I answer without hesitation, no. But there are hundreds speaking of and recognizing it...

Certainly the present mild treatment of our slaves is most honorable to that part of our country where slavery exists. Every slave has a comfortable house, is well fed, clothed, and taken care of. He has his family about him, and in sickness has the same medical aid as his master, and has a sure and comfortable retreat in old age, to protect him against its infirmities and weakness. During the whole of his life he is free from care, that cancer of the human heart which destroys at least one-half of the thinking part of mankind, and from which a favored few, very few, can be said to be free. Being without education, and born to obey, moderate labor and discipline are essential. In this state they are happier than they can possibly be if free. The manner of men who would attempt to give them freedom, would be the greatest of their enemies.

Have the Northern states any idea of the value of our slaves? ... If we lost them the value of the lands they cultivate will be diminished [or they will become wholly useless. [A]nd millions of dollars will be lost to the... by the whole Union.

Livermore:

Constitutional Argument

Slavery, sir! Is not established by our Constitution; but a part of the States are indulged (permitted) in the commission of a sin from which they could not at once be restrained, and which they would not consent to abandon. But, sir, if we could, by any process of reasoning, be brought to believe it justifiable to hold others to involuntary servitude, policy forbids that we should increase it! Sir! Until the ceded territory shall have been made into States, and the new States admitted into the Union, we can do what we will with it. We can govern it as a province [colony], or sell it to any other nation

An opportunity is now presented, if not to diminish, at least to prevent, the growth of a sin which sits heavy on the soul of every one of us. By embracing this opportunity, we may retrieve the national character, and, in some degree, our own.

Pinckney:

Congressional Argument

A territory possesses all the legislative, executive and judiciary powers necessary to the protection of the lives, liberties, characters, and properties of their citizens. One of the most important among these is that of deciding for themselves what kind of persons shall inhabit their country. As the other States possess completely this power, Missouri has the same right. Since all the inhabitants of Missouri are against the prohibition of slavery, to insist on it is to entirely put it out of her power to enter the Union, and to keep her in a state of colonial tyranny. If you can exercise this right, where will you be when you stop? If you say there shall be no more slavery, may you not say there shall be no marriage?

The Tallmadge amendment eventually passed in the House but was defeated in the Senate. Southern senators passed another version of the statehood bill, omitting the Tallmadge Amendment. Thus, negotiations began about how to reconcile the two bills. The heated debates centered on two central problems: maintaining a balance of power between slave and free states in Congress and whether the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which prohibited slavery north of the Ohio River, applied to Missouri. Concerning the first point, by 1819 there were 11 free states and 11 slave states. Northerners were concerned that admitting Missouri as a slave state would upset this balance of power in Congress and give southern interests control over the federal government. The problem of a shift in the balance of legislative power was temporarily solved when Maine petitioned for statehood as a free state in 1820. With the addition of Maine, northerners' fears of a southern-controlled Congress were temporarily allayed.

Confronting the second point of contention proved more difficult. Because Missouri was part of the 1803 Louisiana Purchase and therefore not covered under the Northwest Ordinance, debates arose over whether the 1787 law applied to this territory. (The constitutional compromise had been to allow slavery to continue in the South but ban it from the territories north of the Ohio River through the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.) A settlement was eventually reached in which Missouri would be a slave state, but all other parts of the Louisiana Territory north of the 36°30' line (roughly the extension of the border between Missouri and Arkansas) would be free. Although this element of the compromise is usually attributed to Henry Clay, it was actually proposed by Senator J. B. Thomas of Illinois. The admission of Maine as a free state and the designation of Thomas's compromise line seemed to put an end to the conflict, until Missouri proposed a constitution that banned free blacks and mulattoes from the state. This new provision rekindled northern anger. Henry Clay proposed another compromise, offering a vaguely worded resolution stating that this exclusionary clause in the Missouri constitution should never be interpreted so as to violate the rights of any citizen. This resolution implicitly weakened the ability of free blacks to claim the rights of citizenship—a handicap that would become increasingly oppressive in the following decades. But this last compromise resolution succeeded in saving the larger agreement. The compromise legislation finally passed on February 26, 1821. One week later, Missouri was admitted into the Union as a slave state.

This sectional divide over the Missouri question brought to the surface the elemental problem that the founding fathers had failed to resolve in the constitutional debates—namely, how to reconcile the creation of a free republic with a society that relied on and sanctioned slavery. Were the provisions in the Constitution allowing for slavery in the South meant to imply that slavery should expand into new territories or simply be maintained as custom in the places where it was firmly entrenched? Did the Constitution's framers intend to allow slavery to expand or just to exist where it already was? Was society in the newly settling West going to be controlled by slaveholding southerners or by nonslaveholding northerners? These crucial, divisive questions would only temporarily be addressed by the compromises reached in 1820 and 1821. The underlying problems would continue to fester, coming to a head again during the controversies surrounding fugitive slave laws and the Compromise of 1850. The Thomas Proviso prohibiting slavery north of the compromise line was repealed by the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854 and by the Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case of 1857. The bitter conflict over the extension of slavery into the West finally exploded in the violent upheaval of the Civil War, which broke out in 1861. While it failed to provide a permanent solution to the conflict over slavery, the Missouri Compromise temporarily eased the tensions between rival states and established a pattern for the future entrance of slave and free states into the Union.

THE TALLMADGE AMENDMENT AND THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE

Should slavery be allowed in the new territories?

Southerners believed:

Northerners believed:

What did the **Tallmadge Amendment** propose to do? Other than slavery, why was the South so opposed to the Amendment?

Question	Answer
What changes did the Missouri Compromise bring to the U. S. map?	
How did the Missouri Compromise solve the problem of keeping the balance of power in the Senate between free and slave states?	
What territory was added to the slave side?	
What territory was to be kept free of slavery?	
What did the South stand to gain as a result of the Compromise? What did the South stand to lose?	
Why would the South begin to look to the land to the west of the borders of the U.S., in what was then part of Mexico?	
Could either side be considered the winner in this compromise? Why or why not?	

TASK:


Is the Missouri Compromise a good solution to the question of the extension of slavery? Explain...

THE EXPANSION AND LIMITS OF SUFFRAGE

Before 1800, most of the original thirteen states had limited the vote to property owners or taxpayers, thereby excluding about half of the white male population. Westward expansion changed the nature of American politics by undermining the traditional authority structures in the older states. "Old America seems to be breaking up and moving westward," an observer commented in 1817—and supporting democracy in the newer states (see Map 11.1).

Most of the new states extended the right to vote to all white males over the age of twenty-one. Vermont led the way in 1791, followed by Kentucky in 1792. Tennessee (1796) and Ohio (1803) entered with low taxpayer qualifications that approached universal suffrage. By 1820, most of the older states had followed suit. The War of 1812 was an important impetus to change in many states, for the propertyless men called up for militia service in that war questioned why they were eligible to fight but not to vote. There were laggards—Rhode Island, Virginia, and Louisiana did not liberalize their voting qualifications until later—but by 1840, more than 90 percent of adult white males in the nation could vote. And they could vote for more officials: governors and (most important) presidential electors were now elected by direct vote, rather than chosen by small groups of state legislators).

Universal white manhood suffrage, of course, was far from true universal suffrage: the right to vote remained barred to most of the nation's free African American males and to women of any race. Only in five New England states (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts,



MAP 11.1 Population Trends: Westward Expansion, 1830 Westward population movement, only a trickle in 1800, had become a flood by 1830. Between 1800 and 1830, the U.S. white and African American population more than doubled (from 5.3 million to 12.9 million), but the trans-Appalachian population grew tenfold (from 370,000 to 3.7 million). By 1830, more than a third of the nation's inhabitants lived west of the original thirteen states.

and Rhode Island) could free African American men vote before 1865. In the rest of the northern states, the right of free African American men to vote was restricted to only the most affluent property owners. Free African American men were denied the vote in the all of the new western states as well. The Ohio constitution of 1802 denied them the right to vote, to hold public office, and to testify against white men in court cases. The constitutions of other western states—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, and (later) Oregon—attempted to solve the “problem” of free African Americans by simply denying

them entry into the state at all. Of course, all free black men were prohibited from voting in the slave states of the South (see Figure 11.1).

What accounted for this nearly universal denial of voting rights to free black men? Racism—the assumption that African Americans were a different and less capable people—accounted for much of it, an attitude that was strengthened by the backlash against the extremely controversial abolitionist movement of the 1830s and 1840s (see Chapter 13). In addition, as party lines hardened, northern Democrats, the party most closely aligned with




FIGURE 11.1 Race Exclusions for Suffrage, 1790–1855

This graph shows that as the number of states increased so did the percentage that excluded African American men from voting. None of the states that entered the Union after 1819 allowed African American suffrage.

SOURCE: Alexander Keyssar, *The Right to Vote* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), p. 45.

the slave South, opposed enfranchising African American men who were almost certain to vote for their opponents. Above all, it was a sign of the growing influence that the southern slave system cast over all of American politics.

In contrast, the reason for the denial of suffrage to white women was boringly traditional, stemming from the patriarchal belief that men headed households and represented the interests of all household members. Even wealthy single women who lived alone were considered subordinate to male relatives and denied the right to vote. (New Jersey had been an exception to this rule until it amended its constitution in 1807 to withdraw the franchise from propertied women.) Although unable to vote, women of the upper classes had long played important informal roles in national politics, especially in Washington, D.C., where presidents' wives like Abigail Adams and Dolley Madison wielded behind-the-scenes power. At the local level as well, women—often the wives of leading citizens—were accustomed to engaging informally in politics through their benevolent groups. These groups, often church related, and since colonial times not only provided charity to the poor but also raised money to support basic community institutions such as schools, churches, and libraries, in effect setting community priorities in the process.

Although the extension of suffrage to all classes of white men seemed to indicate that women had no role in public affairs, in fact women's informal involvement in politics grew along with the increasing pace of political activity. At the same time, however, as "manhood" rather than property became the qualification for voting, men began to ignore women's customary political activity and to regard their participation as inappropriate, an attitude that politically active women increasingly resented.

Thus, in a period famous for democratization and "the rise of the common man," the exclusion of important groups—African American men and women of all races—marked the limits of liberalization. It is also true that nowhere else in the world was the right to vote as widespread as it was in the United States. This unprecedented confidence in popular opinion made American politics and politicians unique in the changing world of the early nineteenth century. The extension of suffrage to propertyless farm workers and members of the laboring poor in the nation's cities left European observers wondering: Could "mob rule" possibly succeed?


THE ELECTION OF 1824

The 1824 election marked a dramatic end to the political truce that James Monroe had established in 1817. Five candidates, all of them members of the Republican Party, ran for president in the elections of 1824: William H. Crawford of Georgia, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, Henry Clay of Kentucky, Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, who withdrew before the election, to run for vice president. Jackson, a latecomer to the race, was at first not taken seriously because his record as a legislator was lackluster and his political views unknown. He was not a member of the elite political group that had made up the governing class since 1790. However, owing to his national reputation as a military leader, Jackson won 43 percent of the popular vote and 99 electoral votes—more than any other candidate. The runner-up, John Quincy Adams, won 31 percent of the popular vote and 84 electoral votes. But neither had an electoral majority, leaving it up to the House of Representatives, as in the election of 1800, to pick the winner.

After some political dealing, Henry Clay threw his support to Adams, and the House elected Adams president. This was customary and proper: the Constitution gave the House the power to decide, and Clay had every right to advise his followers how to vote. But when Adams named Clay his secretary of state, the traditional stepping-stone to the highest office, Jackson's supporters promptly accused them of a "corrupt bargain." Popular opinion, the new element in politics, supported Jackson. John Quincy Adams served four miserable years as president, knowing that Jackson would challenge him, and win, in 1828 (see Map 11.2).

The legislative accomplishments of Adams's presidency were scanty. Adams tried to enact the coordinated plan for economic development embodied in Henry Clay's American System (see Chapter 9) but was rebuffed by a hostile Congress, although he did succeed in obtaining

funding for an extension of the National Road west from Wheeling—an issue on which he could count on western votes. Southerners blocked Adams's desire to play an important role in hemispheric affairs by refusing his request to send American delegates to a conference in Panama called by the Latin American liberator Simón Bolívar, in part because they feared it might lead to recognition of the revolutionary black republic of Haiti. Adams's desire to lead the nation from a position above politics was frustrated by a political opposition that was an early sign of the emerging two-party system.



	Electoral Vote (%)	Popular Vote (%)
Andrew Jackson	99 (38)	153,544 (43)
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS	84 (32)	108,740 (31)
William H. Crawford	41 (16)	46,618 (13)
Henry Clay	37 (14)	47,136 (13)

MAP 11.2 The Election of 1824 The presidential vote of 1824 was clearly sectional. John Quincy Adams carried his native New England and little else, Henry Clay carried only his own state of Kentucky and two adjoining states, and Crawford's appeal was limited to Virginia and Georgia. Only Andrew Jackson moved beyond the regional support of the Old Southwest to wider appeal and the greatest number of electoral votes. Because no candidate had a majority, however, the election was thrown into the House of Representatives, which chose Adams.

ELECTION OF 1824 -

How did suffrage expand between 1800 and 1840s?

Who won the popular vote in the 1824 election?

Who won the presidency in the 1824 election?

Why was the election of 1824 considered “a corrupt bargain”?



Was the Era of Good Feelings really an era of good feelings?

